In the bustling ports of the world, a silent giant has emerged to dominate the landscape of global trade: the container crane, and China is at the forefront of this technological and industrial prowess. Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (ZPMC), a state-owned Chinese manufacturer, stands as a behemoth, accounting for nearly 80% of the container cranes in U.S. ports and a staggering 70% globally.

This in-depth guide delves into the world of Chinese container cranes, exploring how these machines have become critical nodes in global supply chains and why they pose significant national security concerns. Readers will gain insights into China’s “single champion” industrial program, which has propelled companies like ZPMC to global dominance. You will learn about the advanced technologies integrated into these cranes, including automation, industrial IoT, and the potential for remote control and data surveillance.

The guide will also examine the geopolitical implications of China’s influence in port technology, the cybersecurity risks associated with these

Why China’s cargo cranes at U.S. ports pose espionage risk

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Chinese-Made Cargo Cranes: Security Risks to U.S. Ports

Introduction

The use of Chinese-made cargo cranes at U.S. ports has raised significant security concerns due to potential cyber vulnerabilities and espionage risks. Here is a comprehensive guide to the issue.

Prevalence of Chinese-Made Cranes

• Chinese-made ship-to-shore (STS) cranes, primarily manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (ZPMC), dominate the global market and are used in approximately 80% of U.S. ports[2][4][5].

Security Concerns

Cyber Vulnerabilities

• The cranes are equipped with control technology that could enable remote access, posing a risk of cyber attacks and espionage. Built-in vulnerabilities for remote access and control of these STS cranes are a major concern[1][4][5].

Unauthorized Modifications

• Contracts between U.S. ports and ZPMC do not prohibit or limit unauthorized modifications or access to the equipment, including the installation of backdoors. This lack of oversight allows for potential malicious activities[2][5].

Cellular Modems

• Investigations have found cellular modems installed in the cranes that were not requested by the ports. These modems could be used for remote access, enabling potential espionage and sabotage[3][5].

National Security Implications

Chinese Government Involvement

• ZPMC is a state-owned company, and under Chinese national security laws, it is mandated to cooperate with state intelligence agencies. This raises concerns that any remote access could be extended to other PRC government entities[2][3][5].

Geopolitical Ambitions

• The PRC’s geopolitical ambitions, particularly regarding Taiwan, could lead to the restriction or manipulation of critical components essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure, further exacerbating security risks[2].

Regulatory and Administrative Responses

MARSEC Directives

• The U.S. Coast Guard has issued MARSEC Directive 105-5, which sets out additional cyber risk management requirements for STS cranes made by Chinese companies. This directive follows earlier security measures outlined in MARSEC Directive 105-4[1][4].

Executive Order

• President Joe Biden signed an executive order to strengthen maritime cybersecurity, fortify the supply chain, and strengthen the U.S. industrial base. The order includes a $20 billion investment in U.S. port infrastructure over the next five years and mandates the replacement of Chinese-made cranes with ones made in America[1][5].

Recommendations and Mitigation Strategies

Severing Connections

• Recommendations include severing connections between ZPMC cranes and cellular modems and installing operational technology monitoring software to enhance security[2].

Enhanced Oversight

• Port and terminal operators, crane owners, and other involved parties must contact their Coast Guard District commander or captain of the port to obtain and implement the security directives[1][4].

Training and Research

• The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, alongside the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), has launched the Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) platform to bolster cybersecurity at U.S. harbors[4].

Conclusion

The presence of Chinese-made cargo cranes at U.S. ports poses significant security risks, including cyber vulnerabilities and potential espionage. Ongoing investigations and regulatory actions highlight the need for immediate and robust measures to mitigate these risks and ensure the security and integrity of U.S. maritime infrastructure.

Congressional probe finds communications gear in …

Congressional Probe into Chinese-Made Cranes at US Ports

Introduction

A recent congressional investigation has uncovered significant concerns regarding the presence of undocumented communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes installed at various US ports. This discovery has heightened fears about potential national security risks, including surveillance and sabotage.

Scope of the Investigation

• The investigation was conducted jointly by the House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Select Committee on China.
• It focused on over 200 Chinese-made cranes deployed at US ports and related facilities[1][2][5].

Findings of the Investigation

Undocumented Communications Equipment

• The investigation revealed that some of these cranes contain cellular modems that were not documented in any contract between US ports and the Chinese crane manufacturer, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC)[1][2][5].
• These modems were installed in China before the cranes were delivered to the US, and US port personnel were unaware of their presence when they inspected the cranes in China[1][2].

Potential Uses of the Modems

• The cellular modems could be used for remote communication, raising concerns that they might be utilized for intelligence collection or to disrupt port operations.
• While some modems were used for legitimate operational functions such as monitoring and tracking maintenance remotely, others had no clear purpose and were not requested by the ports[2][4].

Security Concerns

National Security Risks

• The presence of these undocumented modems has fueled concerns that the cranes could be used for spying on US ports or even for sabotage in the event of a conflict.
• The Biden administration is particularly concerned about the potential for these cranes to pose a covert national-security risk[2][5].

Control by Chinese State-Owned Company

• ZPMC, the manufacturer of these cranes, is a state-owned Chinese company, which raises additional concerns about China’s control over critical infrastructure in the US.
• This control is seen as a significant threat to US security, especially given that ZPMC manufactures over 75% of the container cranes used in ports worldwide[3].

Implications and Responses

Congressional and Administrative Actions

• The discovery has prompted calls for the replacement of these Chinese-made cranes to prevent China from having control over US port infrastructure.
• There are ongoing efforts to ban or restrict the use of other Chinese technology, such as Huawei telecommunications equipment and TikTok, due to similar security concerns[3].

International Implications

• The issue is not isolated to the US; it has global implications as ZPMC cranes are used in ports around the world.
• There is a push for US allies to also take steps to secure their infrastructure against potential Chinese surveillance and sabotage[3].

Conclusion

The presence of undocumented communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes at US ports has significant national security implications. The findings of the congressional investigation highlight the need for stringent measures to ensure the security of critical infrastructure and to mitigate the risks associated with foreign-made equipment, particularly from state-controlled entities.

Chinese-Built Port Cranes May Be Able to Call Home On …

Chinese-Built Port Cranes: Potential National Security Risks

Introduction

Chinese-built cargo cranes at U.S. ports have come under scrutiny due to concerns about potential national security risks. These cranes, predominantly manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a Chinese state-owned company, have been found to contain communications equipment that could be used for espionage and infrastructure disruption.

Discovery of Communication Devices

A congressional investigation revealed that some of the Chinese-made cranes contain cellular modems and other communication devices that could be accessed remotely. These devices were not requested by the ports and have raised significant concerns about their purpose and potential misuse[1][2][4].

National Security Concerns

The presence of these communication devices has sparked fears that China could use these cranes for intelligence collection and to disrupt U.S. port operations. Experts like Dmitri Alperovitch, a former special adviser to the Department of Defense, have highlighted the risks, including the ability to monitor port activities, track the provenance and destination of containers, and potentially sabotage infrastructure during a conflict[1][2].

Capabilities and Risks

• Remote Access: The cranes can be controlled, serviced, and programmed from remote locations, making them vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese government hackers[4].
• Intelligence Collection: The devices can gather information about materials being shipped in or out of the country, which could be crucial for understanding U.S. military operations and logistics[1][2].
• Infrastructure Disruption: The potential to shut down domestic port operations could have catastrophic economic and security consequences, disrupting both commercial and military supply chains[4].

Government Response

In response to these concerns, the U.S. government has taken several steps:
– Maritime Cybersecurity Measures: The Biden administration plans to invest in maritime cybersecurity measures to secure critical infrastructure at U.S. ports[1].
– Replacement of Foreign-Built Cranes: There are plans to replace Chinese-made cranes with domestically manufactured ones. For instance, cranes produced by PACEO Corp., a U.S.-based subsidiary of Japan’s Mitsui E&S, will be used to replace existing Chinese cranes[2].
– Maritime Security Directive: The U.S. Coast Guard will issue a Maritime Security Directive requiring owners and operators of Chinese-made cranes to take specific actions to secure their IT and OT systems[2].

Broader Implications

The issue of Chinese-made cranes is part of a larger discussion about the security and geopolitical implications of relying on foreign technology for critical infrastructure:
– Global Trade Dynamics: China’s dominance in port automation and technology raises concerns about its potential leverage over vital resources and trade routes[3].
– Data Security: The use of Chinese-run data systems, such as Logink, which track cargo flow at ports globally, adds to the concerns about data security and the potential for disruptions[2].

Conclusion

The presence of communication devices in Chinese-built port cranes at U.S. ports poses significant national security risks. The U.S. government is taking proactive steps to address these concerns, including enhancing cybersecurity measures, replacing foreign-built cranes, and issuing directives to secure maritime infrastructure. As the global shipping industry continues to evolve with automation, ensuring the security and integrity of critical infrastructure remains a paramount concern.

Joint Investigation into CCP-Backed Company Supplying …

Joint Investigation into CCP-Backed Company Supplying Cranes to U.S. Ports: Key Findings and Implications

Introduction

A joint investigation by several House committees has uncovered significant concerns regarding Chinese-built cargo cranes deployed at various U.S. ports. The investigation, focused on Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a state-owned Chinese manufacturer, has revealed the presence of unexpected and potentially risky communications equipment.

Scope of the Investigation

• The investigation involves multiple House committees examining the installation and operation of ZPMC ship-to-shore (STS) cranes at U.S. maritime ports.
• The probe has identified several issues related to the presence of cellular modems and other communication devices on these cranes.

Discovery of Unauthorized Communications Equipment

• Cellular modems were found on ZPMC STS crane components at multiple U.S. seaports.
• These modems were not part of the original equipment contracts between U.S. ports and ZPMC.
• Port officials were unable to determine why these modems had been installed.
• A cellular modem was also discovered in the server room of another U.S. port, which houses the firewall and networking equipment for the STS cranes.

Security Concerns

• The presence of these unauthorized modems has raised significant security concerns.
• There is a fear that these devices could be used for remote communication, potentially allowing for spying or sabotage.
• The Biden administration is particularly concerned about the potential for these cranes to be used as tools for surveillance or espionage by the Chinese government.

Involvement of Other Companies

• The investigation also involves the Swiss company ABB, as many of the operational components manufactured by ABB are shipped to China, stored for several months, and then installed onto U.S.-bound port equipment by ZPMC engineers.

Historical Context and Previous Incidents

• In 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered intelligence-gathering equipment on a vessel delivering ZPMC cranes to the Port of Baltimore.
• ZPMC accounts for nearly 80% of the STS cranes in use at U.S. maritime ports, many of which are built in an area adjacent to a shipyard where the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s advanced warships are constructed.

Implications for National Security

• The widespread presence of ZPMC cranes at U.S. ports, coupled with the discovery of unauthorized communication devices, poses a substantial national security risk.
• Lawmakers and officials are concerned about the potential for these cranes to be used as part of a broader Chinese espionage effort.
• The investigation highlights the need for enhanced scrutiny and security measures regarding foreign-made equipment critical to U.S. infrastructure.

Ongoing Concerns and Future Actions

• The investigation is ongoing, with committees seeking additional information regarding ZPMC’s engagement with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and any requests from the CCP to ZPMC.
• There is a growing call for increased vigilance and regulatory oversight to ensure that critical infrastructure in the U.S. is not compromised by foreign entities with potential malicious intentions.

Conclusion

The joint investigation into ZPMC and the discovery of unauthorized communications equipment on Chinese-built cranes at U.S. ports have significant implications for national security. It underscores the need for rigorous inspection and oversight of foreign-made equipment, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors, to mitigate potential risks of espionage and sabotage.

Chinese Cargo Cranes at U.S. Ports Pose Espionage Risk …

Chinese Cargo Cranes at U.S. Ports: Espionage and Security Risks

Introduction

A recent congressional investigation has uncovered significant security risks associated with Chinese-made cargo cranes used at U.S. seaports. These cranes, manufactured by the state-owned company Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), pose potential threats to national security, supply chain integrity, and the overall infrastructure of U.S. ports.

Scope of the Issue

• Market Dominance: ZPMC accounts for approximately 80% of all ship-to-shore cranes in U.S. ports, highlighting a critical dependency on Chinese-manufactured equipment[2][3][5].
• Geographical Focus: The investigation found that ZPMC has shown particular interest in requesting remote access to its cranes located on the West Coast of the United States[2][3].

Security Risks and Vulnerabilities

Embedded Technology and Remote Access

• Cellular Modems: ZPMC has installed cellular modems in the cranes, which can be remotely accessed. These modems were sometimes installed without the knowledge or consent of port authorities and beyond the scope of existing contracts[2][3][5].
• Maintenance and Espionage: While the modems are ostensibly for diagnostic and maintenance purposes, they could potentially allow the Chinese government to gain access to the cranes due to China’s national security laws that mandate cooperation with state intelligence agencies[2][3][5].

Pressure on Port Operators

• Remote Access Requests: ZPMC has pressured U.S. port operators to allow the company to maintain remote access to the cranes. Many ports have acquiesced to these requests due to the desire for lower prices or robust warranty policies[2][3].

National Security Implications

• Espionage and Disruption: The ability to access these cranes remotely could enable the Chinese government to spy on U.S. ports and disrupt supply chains, potentially crippling key infrastructure and affecting the U.S. economy[2][3][5].
• Future Geopolitical Conflicts: In a future conflict, these vulnerabilities could serve as a “choke point” for U.S. supply chains, giving China significant leverage over global supply chains[1].

Broader Strategic Vulnerabilities

Critical Infrastructure

• Cyber Vulnerabilities: The presence of Chinese-made cranes is part of a broader pattern of China-backed cyber threats targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, including water treatment facilities, the electrical grid, and transportation networks[1].
• Old-School Digital Weaknesses: The U.S. suffers from outdated cyber hygiene practices, such as using easy-to-guess passwords and inadequate system segregation, making it vulnerable to sophisticated cyber attacks[1].

Economic and Military Implications

• Global Supply Chain Chaos: The potential disruption of U.S. ports could lead to global supply chain chaos, especially given the dominance of ZPMC in the global market for ship-to-shore cranes[1][2][5].
• PRC’s Geopolitical Ambitions: China’s assertiveness, particularly regarding Taiwan, raises concerns about the security of U.S. maritime supply chains. In a potential future dispute, China could restrict or manipulate the supply of critical components essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure[5].

Recommendations and Actions

Immediate Mitigation

• Severing Connections: Recommendations include severing the connections between ZPMC cranes and cellular modems to prevent unauthorized access[5].
• Operational Technology Monitoring: Installing operational technology monitoring software to enhance security and oversight[5].

Long-Term Strategies

• Replacing Foreign-Made Cranes: The Biden administration has announced plans to replace foreign-made cranes with American-manufactured ones and imposed a 25% tariff on cranes made in China[1].
• Strengthening Maritime Cybersecurity: The administration has also announced an Executive Order to strengthen maritime cybersecurity, fortify the supply chain, and invest $20 billion into U.S. port infrastructure over the next five years[5].

Conclusion

The use of Chinese-made cargo cranes at U.S. seaports poses significant security risks, including the potential for espionage, supply chain disruption, and broader geopolitical vulnerabilities. Addressing these risks requires immediate action to secure existing infrastructure and long-term strategies to reduce dependency on foreign-manufactured critical equipment.

Chinese-made port cranes in US included ‘backdoor …

Overview of the Threat Posed by Chinese-Made Port Cranes in US Ports

Introduction

A recent congressional examination conducted by the House Select Committee on China and the House Homeland Security Committee has uncovered significant security vulnerabilities associated with Chinese-made port cranes in U.S. ports. This guide provides a detailed overview of the findings and the implications for national security.

Key Findings of the Congressional Investigation

Technological Backdoors

• The investigation revealed that Chinese-made ship-to-shore cranes, manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC), contain technological backdoors. These backdoors are in the form of cellular modems that were not requested by U.S. ports or included in the contracts[1][3][5].

Purpose of the Modems

• These cellular modems were intended for the collection of usage data on certain equipment. However, they create a significant backdoor security vulnerability that could undermine the integrity of port operations. Technicians at the ports believed these modems were for diagnostic purposes, but they could potentially bypass firewalls and disrupt port operations[1][3][5].

Unauthorized Installations

• The modems were installed without the knowledge of port authorities and beyond the scope of contracts with ZPMC. This unauthorized access could potentially be extended to other PRC government entities, posing a significant risk due to China’s national security laws that mandate cooperation with state intelligence agencies[1][2][3].

Cybersecurity and National Security Risks

Dominance of ZPMC in Global Market

• ZPMC dominates the global market share of ship-to-shore (STS) port cranes, accounting for roughly 80% of the STS cranes operational in the U.S. This dominance adds to the PRC’s broader maritime infrastructure control and creates cybersecurity vulnerabilities and national security risks for the U.S. and its allies[3][5].

Potential for Espionage and Disruption

• The presence of these modems and the potential for remote access by ZPMC or other PRC entities poses a serious threat to national security. It could allow Beijing to covertly gain access to the machines, enabling espionage and disruption of port operations[2][3][4].

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

• Contracts with ZPMC often allow critical internal components from third-party contractors to be sent to China for installation. This lack of oversight during assembly in China increases the risk of unauthorized modifications or the installation of backdoors into the equipment[1][3][5].

Geopolitical Implications

Tensions Over Taiwan

• The report highlights concerns over the PRC’s geopolitical ambitions, particularly regarding Taiwan. In a potential future dispute, the PRC could restrict or manipulate the supply of critical components or materials essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure, severely disrupting U.S. commercial activities and hindering the Department of Defense’s ability to deploy supplies and resources[3][4][5].

Broader Maritime Infrastructure Control

• The investigation found that two PRC state-owned enterprises control portions of five U.S. ports and lead tens of billions of dollars in PRC overseas seaport investments. Many of these seaports use equipment and technology originating from the PRC, further exacerbating the security risks[4][5].

Recommendations and Mitigation Strategies

Severing Connections and Enhancing Cybersecurity

• The committees recommend that U.S. ports sever the connections between ZPMC cranes and cellular modems and install operational technology monitoring software to enhance cybersecurity[3].

Strengthening Maritime Cybersecurity

• The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard are advised to prioritize closing security gaps, particularly at strategic seaports like Guam’s port, to ensure the safety and security of DoD-designated commercial strategic seaports[3].

Domestic Production of Critical Hardware

• To mitigate long-term risks, the U.S. is working with Japanese heavy industrial company Matsui to start domestic production of ship-to-shore cranes in America, aiming to reduce reliance on Chinese-made equipment[1].

Conclusion

The presence of Chinese-made port cranes with embedded technological backdoors in U.S. ports poses significant cybersecurity and national security risks. The findings of the congressional investigation underscore the need for immediate action to secure U.S. port infrastructure and reduce dependence on equipment manufactured by companies controlled by the PRC. Implementing the recommended mitigation strategies is crucial to protecting the integrity of U.S. maritime operations and ensuring national security.

US targets Chinese-made container cranes in spy crackdown

Guide to the Cybersecurity Risks and Regulatory Actions Surrounding Chinese-Made Container Cranes at U.S. Ports

Introduction

The use of Chinese-made container cranes at U.S. ports has raised significant cybersecurity and national security concerns. Here is a comprehensive guide to the issues and the regulatory actions being taken.

Prevalence and Vulnerability of Chinese-Made Cranes

• Chinese-manufactured ship-to-shore (STS) container gantry cranes, primarily produced by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. (ZPMC), account for nearly 80% of the STS cranes at U.S. ports[3].
• These cranes are designed to be controlled, serviced, and programmed from remote locations, which potentially leaves them vulnerable to exploitation by hostile actors[3].

Cybersecurity Risks

• The cranes’ remote access capabilities and built-in technology make them susceptible to cyber threats. This could allow the Chinese government or other malicious actors to monitor port operations, collect data on shipping containers, and potentially disrupt supply chains[1][3][5].
• More than a dozen cellular modems were found in these cranes, some of which were not requested by the ports. These modems can be used for remote access, raising concerns about espionage and sabotage[2][3].

Regulatory Actions and Directives

• The U.S. Coast Guard has issued Maritime Security Directive 105-4, which outlines required cyber-risk management actions for owners and operators of Chinese-manufactured STS cranes. This directive is not publicly available due to its security-sensitive nature[3].
• Owners and operators of these cranes must contact their local captain of the port or district commander to obtain a copy of the directive and comply with its requirements.
• The Coast Guard has conducted cybersecurity assessments and threat hunting missions on over 50% of the existing cranes to determine their cybersecurity posture and identify any malicious cyber activity[3].

Economic and Security Implications

• The potential exploitation of these cranes could have catastrophic economic and security consequences. Disrupting port operations could suspend all commercial activity, affecting both military and commercial supply chains[1][2].
• House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Mark Green has emphasized that these vulnerabilities could provide China with an easy means of infiltrating U.S. critical infrastructure, undermining national security and economic stability[2].

Additional Cybersecurity Measures

• The U.S. Maritime Administration has issued an advisory providing guidance and mitigation measures for ports, vessel operators, and shippers to protect data at risk of being hacked in a cyberattack.
• There are proposed rule changes by the Coast Guard that include minimum requirements for cybersecurity plans for U.S.-flagged vessels, ports, and container terminal operators[3].

Reporting and Compliance

• Any evidence of sabotage, subversive activity, or actual or threatened cyber incidents involving these cranes must be reported immediately to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Captain of the Port[3].

Legislative and Industry Responses

• The House Homeland Security Committee has called for additional detailed information on the cybersecurity threats posed by these cranes and has compared them to other security risks like Huawei.
• The American Association of Port Authorities has responded to the concerns by labeling them as “alarmist” and “sensationalized,” but also supports legislative efforts to restore U.S. manufacturing capabilities for port equipment to mitigate long-term risks[4].

By understanding these points, stakeholders can better navigate the complex issues surrounding Chinese-made container cranes at U.S. ports and the ongoing efforts to address the associated cybersecurity and national security risks.

U.S. Moves Forward with Sweeping Tariffs on China …

U.S. Tariffs on Chinese-Made Port Cranes: An In-Depth Guide

Introduction

The U.S. has implemented sweeping tariff increases on a wide range of Chinese goods, including ship-to-shore (STS) cranes used in American ports. This move is part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to counter China’s unfair trade practices and address national security concerns.

Tariff Details

Scope and Implementation

• The U.S. Trade Representative has completed its review and will impose a 25% tariff on Chinese-made STS cranes, effective in 2024[1][3][4].
• The tariffs cover various Chinese goods, including semiconductors, steel and aluminum products, electric vehicles, batteries, permanent magnets, and medical products.

Exclusions

• An exclusion has been made for contracts executed prior to May 14, 2024, and cranes that enter the United States prior to May 14, 2026. This aims to mitigate the immediate financial impact on U.S. ports that had already placed orders for these cranes[1][3][5].

Impact on U.S. Ports

Financial Burden

• The tariffs are expected to significantly increase costs for U.S. ports. For example, the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) estimated that the tariffs could result in an additional $131 million in costs for ports that had already ordered cranes from Chinese manufacturers[1][3][5].

Operational Concerns

• Port officials argue that the immediate implementation of tariffs would punish U.S. port operators without providing a strong alternative. This could raise costs or delay critical port infrastructure investments[1][2].

Industry and Security Concerns

Dominance of Chinese Manufacturers

• China’s state-owned Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC) dominates the global market for STS cranes, supplying around 80% of all STS cranes ordered by U.S. ports and holding a 70% global market share[1][2][3].

Cybersecurity Risks

• There have been accusations of espionage related to ZPMC cranes, with reports of cellular modems that could bypass the port’s local area network. The U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee has highlighted these threats, leading to increased cybersecurity measures and new authorities for the U.S. Coast Guard[1][3].

Responses and Alternatives

Industry Lobbying

• The AAPA and other port authorities have lobbied against the tariffs, arguing they would not achieve their intended objectives and would instead harm port efficiency, capacity, and the broader U.S. economy[1][2][5].

Domestic Manufacturing Initiatives

• To address the reliance on Chinese manufacturers, the Biden Administration has initiated efforts to bring back port crane manufacturing to the U.S. This includes an agreement with PACECO Corp., a U.S.-based subsidiary of Japan’s Mitsui E&S Co., to relaunch U.S. manufacturing capabilities for cranes after a 30-year absence. Additionally, Finnish-based Konecranes is establishing a supplier network to build STS cranes in the U.S.[1].

Long-Term Strategies

Legislative and Financial Incentives

• The U.S. government is considering legislation to build up a domestic crane manufacturing sector. In the meantime, financial incentives are being explored to encourage U.S. ports to purchase cranes from non-adversarial countries[3].

National Security and Economic Objectives

• The tariffs are part of a broader strategy to protect American workers and businesses from China’s unfair trade practices, including technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and market flooding with artificially low-priced exports. The aim is to rebuild U.S. industrial capacity and ensure supply chain security[4].

Conclusion

The imposition of tariffs on Chinese-made STS cranes reflects the U.S. government’s efforts to address both economic and national security concerns. While the immediate financial impact on U.S. ports is significant, the long-term strategy includes developing domestic manufacturing capabilities and ensuring the security of critical port infrastructure.

Chinese-made cranes in US ports fitted with …

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China’s Influence and Cyber Threats to U.S. Ports

Introduction

China’s significant presence in global port infrastructure, particularly through the dominance of Chinese companies like Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (ZPMC), poses substantial economic, military, and cybersecurity risks to the United States.

Cybersecurity Risks Associated with Chinese-Made Cranes

Vulnerabilities in Remote Access and Control

• Chinese-made cranes, predominantly from ZPMC, are equipped with control technology that could enable China to gain remote access to U.S. ports, terminals, and computer-based systems. This is highlighted in the U.S. Coast Guard’s MARSEC Directive 105-5, which emphasizes the potential for China to disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure through these vulnerabilities[1][4][5].

Extent of Chinese Crane Usage in U.S. Ports

• Approximately 80% of U.S. ports use cranes manufactured by Chinese companies, with ZPMC being the leading maker. This widespread use amplifies the potential risks associated with cyber vulnerabilities and espionage[1][4][5].

Congressional Investigations and Findings

• A joint investigation by the House Homeland Security Committee and the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party revealed that ZPMC had pressured port operators to allow remote access to their cranes. This access could be extended to other PRC government entities, posing a significant national security risk due to China’s national security laws that mandate cooperation with state intelligence agencies[4].

National Security Implications

Intelligence Gathering and Sabotage

• China’s control over port infrastructure allows for intelligence gathering and potential sabotage. Ports can serve as dual-use installations, supporting both commercial and military activities. This is particularly concerning in regions like the Western Hemisphere, where China’s presence in ports like Santiago de Cuba could facilitate signals intelligence collection near U.S. military bases[3].

Military and Economic Security Threats

• China’s dominance in global port infrastructure threatens U.S. economic and military security. Ports operated or owned by China could be used to interfere with U.S. military and economic operations, including disrupting supply chains and accessing sensitive information related to trade and military movements[2][3].

Strategic Challenges and Recommendations

Control Over Logistics Routes

• China’s control over ports gives it significant influence over preferred logistics routes, which can be leveraged for both economic and military advantage. This control also enables China to project power within the U.S. hemisphere without direct military confrontation[3].

Need for Transparency and Secure Operations

• To counter China’s influence, the U.S. should promote transparency in global port infrastructure procurement and ensure that ports operate in a secure manner. This includes working with allies and partners to offer better terms and financing to counter China’s growing influence[2][3].

Policy and Legislative Actions

• Recent legislation and directives aim to address the risks posed by Chinese technology in U.S. ports. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a study on cybersecurity and national security threats from foreign-manufactured cranes. Additionally, there are proposals to ban Chinese state-owned logistics platforms like LOGINK from accessing U.S. ports[5].

Mitigation Strategies

Replacement of Chinese-Made Cranes

• The U.S. government has initiated steps to replace Chinese-made cranes with ones manufactured in America. President Joe Biden signed an executive order stipulating that infrastructure funding for port upgrades should be used to replace these cranes[1].

Enhanced Cyber Risk Management

• The U.S. Coast Guard has issued directives requiring port and terminal operators to implement additional cyber risk management measures for Chinese-manufactured cranes. This includes contacting Coast Guard District commanders or captains of the port to obtain clearance-sensitive directives[1].

International Cooperation and Security Assistance

• The U.S. should prioritize working with countries to ensure transparent and secure port operations. This includes security assistance programs and bilateral working groups to support port security capacity-building efforts[3].

In conclusion, the presence of Chinese-made cranes and China’s broader influence in global port infrastructure pose significant cybersecurity, economic, and military risks to the United States. Addressing these risks requires a multifaceted approach involving legislative actions, international cooperation, and enhanced security measures to protect U.S. critical infrastructure.

Espionage Probe Finds Communications Device on …

Chinese Cargo Cranes in U.S. Ports: Espionage and National Security Concerns

Introduction

A recent congressional investigation has uncovered significant national security concerns related to Chinese-built cargo cranes installed in U.S. ports. The findings have sparked widespread alarm about potential espionage and cyber threats posed by these cranes.

Discovery of Communication Devices

• The investigation revealed that Chinese-made cargo cranes, predominantly manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a state-owned Chinese company, were equipped with unusual communication devices.
• These devices included cellular modems that could be accessed remotely, raising concerns about their potential use for espionage and disruption of U.S. port operations[1][2][4].

Nature of the Communication Devices

• While modems are not unusual in industrial equipment for remote monitoring and maintenance, the modems found on these cranes were not requested by the U.S. ports and did not appear to support the normal operations of the cranes.
• More than 12 cellular modems were found in cranes at several U.S. ports, with some of these modems installed as early as 2017, around the time the cranes were built in China[3][4].

National Security Implications

• The presence of these modems has fueled concerns that the Chinese government could use them to collect valuable intelligence and exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. critical infrastructure.
• Experts warn that these devices could be used for intelligence collection, monitoring port activities, and potentially disrupting logistics and operations in the event of a conflict[2][3].

Response from Chinese Authorities

• China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has denied the allegations, stating that the accusations are unfounded and that the U.S. is using discrimination as a bargaining chip in world trade.
• The Chinese government claims to respect the principles of market economy and fair competition, and demands a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment[1].

U.S. Government and Port Authorities’ Response

• The House Homeland Security Committee and other congressional committees have been actively investigating these findings, highlighting the need for enhanced cybersecurity measures.
• The Biden administration has announced plans to invest in replacing foreign-built cranes with domestically manufactured ones to mitigate potential security risks.
• U.S. ports are working closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, federal law enforcement, and private sector experts to inspect and secure their equipment against cyber threats[1][2][4].

Broader Context and Legislative Actions

• The discovery is part of a broader concern about Chinese interference in U.S. affairs, leading to increased scrutiny of Chinese technology and companies.
• Legislation has been introduced to pressure companies like ByteDance, the owner of TikTok, to divest from associations with the Chinese Communist Party due to similar espionage and surveillance concerns[1][2].

Mitigation and Future Steps

• Ports have begun removing the undocumented modems from the cranes, with some having been removed as recently as October 2023.
• Ongoing efforts include enhanced inspections, defensive measures, and the development of maritime cybersecurity protocols to protect U.S. ports from potential cyberattacks[3][4].

Conclusion

The presence of unrequested and undocumented communication devices on Chinese-made cargo cranes in U.S. ports has significant implications for national security. The ongoing investigations and responses from U.S. authorities underscore the critical need for vigilance and proactive measures to safeguard critical infrastructure against potential espionage and cyber threats.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What are the key types of container cranes manufactured in China?

China is a significant producer of various types of container cranes, each designed to meet specific needs in port operations. The primary types include Ship-to-Shore (STS) container cranes, also known as quayside container cranes, which are essential for loading and unloading containers from ships. These cranes are engineered to handle high weight capacities and operate with precision and speed, enhancing port productivity. Other types include gantry cranes, mobile cranes, and tower cranes, each offering different functionalities and applications in port environments.

What are the key parameters and information included on the nameplate of a container crane from China?

The nameplate of a container crane from China includes several critical parameters that provide essential information about the crane’s capabilities and specifications. These include the Product License Code, which is required for the production of special equipment like cranes; the Type code, which differentiates between various models; the Lifting Capacity, which is the maximum weight the crane can lift under normal working conditions; Lifting Speed, which is the vertical displacement speed of the rated load; Crane Travel Speed and Trolley Travel Speed, which indicate the horizontal movement speeds; Working Grade, which reflects the crane’s utilization class and load state; Span, which is the horizontal distance between the crane’s main girder running tracks; and Lifting Height, which is the distance from the ground to the highest lifting position of the material handling device.

Why do ports prefer to import container cranes from China?

Ports prefer to import container cranes from China due to several compelling reasons. China is a global leader in manufacturing robust and technologically advanced cranes, offering them at competitive prices compared to Western counterparts. Chinese manufacturers adhere to high international quality standards, often holding ISO and CE certifications. Additionally, these cranes are highly reliable and efficient, benefiting from Chinese advancements in automation and heavy machinery. Customization capabilities are also a significant advantage, allowing cranes to be tailored to meet the specific operational needs of different port environments.

What are the steps involved in importing and shipping container cranes from China?

Importing and shipping container cranes from China involves several detailed steps. First, define your specific requirements, including the crane’s lifting capacity, speed, and span. Next, locate the right suppliers through platforms like Alibaba, international expos, or industry networks. Conduct a thorough supplier evaluation by verifying their credentials, reviewing their project portfolios, and if possible, visiting their manufacturing facilities. Negotiate and finalize the contract, ensuring it covers all specifications, delivery commitments, and after-sales support. For shipping, choose the right mode of transport, typically ocean freight using Ro-Ro or breakbulk methods, and partner with experienced logistics companies to manage the entire process.

What are the cybersecurity concerns associated with Chinese-made container cranes?

There are significant cybersecurity concerns associated with Chinese-made container cranes, particularly those used in U.S. ports. These cranes, especially Ship-to-Shore (STS) gantry cranes, can be controlled, serviced, and programmed from remote locations, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation. The U.S. Coast Guard has issued directives requiring owners and operators of these cranes to implement cyber-risk management actions to prevent potential security incidents. The concerns stem from the possibility of remote access and control, which could be exploited by malicious actors, highlighting the need for strict cybersecurity measures and precautions to block uncontrolled access to terminal operations.